PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN FRANCE: THE LEADING CONTENDERS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR UKRAINE
Why do France's presidential elections matter for Ukraine?
France's next presidential election is due in spring 2027. Emmanuel Macron, the incumbent president who has been in office since 2017, will be ineligible to stand again and so France is guaranteed a new leader next year. The French Republic is currently an important partner in supporting Ukraine against Russian aggression, and the country's political system is structured in such a way that the president largely determines the direction of its policy. France's initially cautious support for Ukraine began to deepen from 2024 onwards, and French assistance now spans the financial, political-diplomatic, and military spheres. While some criticise France's support for Ukraine as insufficient, its role remains significant. France supplies Ukraine with key categories of weaponry, including multirole aircraft and scarce air and missile defence systems. Beyond this, the French Republic acts as an important advocate for Ukraine on the international stage, initiating and promoting new formats of support such as the idea of deploying European forces on Ukrainian territory. Taken together, this means that the 2027 election and its outcome will have a tangible impact on Ukraine's position.
Although the field of presidential candidates has yet to be finalised, it is already possible to identify the likely frontrunners. The candidate currently considered most likely to win is Marine Le Pen, the longstanding leader of the French far right. Her party, the National Rally, has held first place in French opinion polls for some time, and Le Pen's own support recently exceeded 34%.
Marine Le Pen, National Rally
Marine Le Pen and her party's political programme has traditionally focused on immigration, proposing a sharp 80-90% reduction in the influx of new immigrants to France through strict migration legislation. Le Pen and her party also want to give French citizens preferential rights over immigrants in the social sphere, abolish birthright citizenship*, and restrict the ability of foreigners to acquire French citizenship more broadly as much as possible.
The far right's main economic priorities are increasing purchasing power, strengthening citizens’ social protection, and promoting the country's industrial development. Proposals include reducing VAT on energy and essential goods, supporting wage growth in the private sector through lower taxation, lowering the retirement age, and pursuing reindustrialisation on the basis of economic nationalism. These measures are to be funded primarily through cuts to immigration-related spending and by combating tax fraud. Analysts frequently describe such funding plans as unrealistic, which is why the far right's economic programme is widely characterised as populist.
On foreign policy, the far right favours a less active international role for France, adopting a critical stance towards any expansion of the country's international commitments. Marine Le Pen is a committed Eurosceptic who promotes the idea of expanding national sovereignty and reducing the French Republic's dependence on pan-European institutions. One of the National Rally's goals is also France's withdrawal from NATO's integrated military command, not to be confused with withdrawal from NATO itself. This is a point of principle for Le Pen.**
Despite some shifts in rhetoric, Marine Le Pen and the National Rally's position on Ukraine remains far from aligned with Ukrainian interests. In the 2010s, Le Pen had fairly close ties with Russia: her party received a loan from a bank connected to the Russian authorities, and Le Pen herself effectively endorsed the annexation of Crimea. After 2022, she significantly adjusted her public stance towards Russia, condemning the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. At the same time, Le Pen supports a cautious approach to anti-Russian sanctions and is sceptical of military assistance to Ukraine and of the country's Euro-Atlantic integration. More broadly, the French far right frequently attempts to block various initiatives to support Ukraine and constrain Russia, arguing that such steps do not serve French national interests. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that a Marine Le Pen victory in the presidential election could radically shift France's position on Ukraine, substantially reducing all forms of support and diminishing diplomatic engagement.
Jean-Luc Mélenchon, La France Insoumise
Another contender for the French presidency is Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the leader of the far left party La France Insoumise. His current level of support stands at around 15%, which realistically gives him a chance of reaching the second round. His prospects of winning the election, however, are assessed as low due to an exceptionally high negative rating. He commands the support of a limited segment of French society, while the majority of voters rule out voting for him. This makes him the ideal second-round opponent for the other leading candidates, none of whom face the same difficulties in broadening their support base.
For most of his long political career, Jean-Luc Mélenchon was a member of the Socialist Party. In 2008, however, he broke with the French Socialists over ideological differences stemming from his rejection of their centrist course. He founded his own Left Party in 2009, and in 2016 established his current political force, La France Insoumise.
Mélenchon's electoral programme is sharply critical of the French political system and the contemporary capitalist economy, grounded in a vision of socialist transformation. He proposes strengthening social protection through a return to a retirement age of 60 (currently 62–63 depending on year of birth), raising the minimum wage, and increasing state control over pay. The sharp increase in social spending this would require is to be funded through a more progressive taxation system for businesses and additional taxes on the wealthy.
The far left's economic programme envisages substantial economic interventionism including the establishment of state control over strategic sectors, expanded nationalisation, active protection of French industry, and a transition to 'ecological planning.' This last element is central to Mélenchon's economic vision and involves moving France towards a climate-neutral economy through active state intervention.
On immigration, Mélenchon takes the traditional supportive position of the socialist left. He regards the influx of foreigners into France as beneficial to its cultural and economic development.
On the political system, the leader of La France Insoumise proposes strengthening popular sovereignty, arguing for the return of power to society and a break with what he calls the 'presidential monarchy.' His ideas in practice amount to radical political change: reducing presidential power and developing direct democracy through referendums. It is partly because of these sweeping approaches to the economy and his total opposition to the existing order that Mélenchon is frequently described as a left-wing populist.
Jean-Luc Mélenchon also holds radical views on French foreign policy. He is an active critic of France's NATO membership, describing the alliance as an instrument of American imperialism, and takes the view that neither NATO nor pan-European defence initiatives will serve French national security. His foreign policy vision centres on expanding France's strategic sovereignty and ensuring its non-participation in military-political blocs. To some extent, the far-left leader can also be considered a Eurosceptic: he is an active critic of the current 'neoliberal' model of the European Union and takes the view that France could decline to implement those EU directives that conflict with his socio-economic programme. At the same time, Mélenchon does not support his country's withdrawal from the union, but rather advocates its transformation along social-democratic principles.
Mélenchon's position on the Russo-Ukrainian war is broadly ambivalent. Before 2022, he adopted an essentially neutral stance towards Russian aggression against Ukraine: in 2014 he declined to condemn the annexation of Crimea and effectively blamed the United States and NATO for 'provoking' Russia. After the start of the full-scale invasion, he condemned Russia as the aggressor and called for the withdrawal of its forces from Ukrainian territory. Nevertheless, Mélenchon maintained his arguments about NATO's provocative actions and subsequently came out against Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory, describing them as 'reckless.' It is reasonable to conclude that, if he came to power, Mélenchon might reduce France's current support for Ukraine which would be consistent with his broader approach to foreign policy.
Raphaël Glucksmann, Place Publique
Another candidate on the left is Raphaël Glucksmann, co-president of the centre-left party Place Publique. He currently commands the support of around 11.5% of voters and could theoretically contend for a place in the second round. During the 2000s, Glucksmann worked as a documentary filmmaker. His first serious political experience began in 2009, when he became an adviser to Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili on European integration. In 2019, he was elected to the European Parliament on a joint list with the French Socialist Party, and he remains an MEP following his successful re-election in 2024.
An important question for Glucksmann's presidential campaign is the prospect of cooperation between Place Publique and the French Socialist Party. He intends to take part in the Socialists' October primary with the aim of standing as the sole social-democratic candidate in the presidential race. Such cooperation would allow him to secure additional support from left-wing voters and potentially peel away some votes from Jean-Luc Mélenchon.
Glucksmann's programme broadly proposes a range of left-reformist measures. He supports repealing the 2023 pension reform but does not advocate fixing the retirement age at 60. His view is that the pension system should be fairer and more differentiated, taking into account the particularities of different groups' working careers and living conditions. Other elements of his socio-economic programme include raising the minimum wage, improving working conditions, and supporting domestic production and the development of a ‘local economy.’
On migration, Glucksmann takes a fairly moderate position. He broadly supports labour immigration as such, but also states the need to manage migration flows into France and integrate foreigners into French society. He also plans to initiate a wide public debate aimed at defining the Republic's migration policy in more concrete terms.
Glucksmann's foreign policy programme is thoroughly pro-European and Atlanticist. He supports deepening European integration, particularly on shared defence and environmental policy. He has traditionally backed the view that NATO is the key instrument for ensuring European security, though since the beginning of Donald Trump's second presidency he has begun to express doubts about the reliability of American guarantees. Glucksmann is also an active critic of authoritarian regimes around the world, including Russia and China.
He is a wholehearted supporter of Ukraine regarding Russia’s invasion, so much so that he is frequently described as one of the most pro-Ukrainian candidates among the French left and is sometimes even criticised for being too hawkish. Glucksmann currently supports the direct confiscation of frozen Russian assets, the scaling up of arms production within the EU, and a radical increase in European military assistance to Ukraine.
Édouard Philippe, Horizons
The next contender for the leadership of the Fifth Republic is the leader of the centre-right party Horizons, Édouard Philippe. He currently has a notable chance of reaching the second round with 14.5% of the vote and could theoretically defeat Marine Le Pen there. Like his main rivals, Philippe has a long political career. He served as Prime Minister of France from 2017 to 2020 and is currently the serving mayor of Le Havre in Normandy. His party Horizons, founded in 2021, stands on a platform of right-wing reformism and is ideologically close to the incumbent president's party, with some exceptions. Horizons has traditionally been in coalition with pro-presidential parties in parliament, and Philippe's own prime ministership coincided with the beginning of Emmanuel Macron's first term.
Although immigration and internal security occupy an important place in the party's political programme, it rejects radical approaches in this area, unlike National Rally. Philippe's vision centres on strict control of illegal immigration, a reduction in legal migration flows into the country, and promoting the integration of immigrants into French society through cultural assimilation.
On the economy, Édouard Philippe proposes the classical approach of the centre-right: reducing the tax burden on business and lowering the country's debt through spending restraint. This logic naturally leads to his intention to cut social spending and continue the pension reform by fixing the retirement age at 65. Philippe also plans to prioritise funding for education and research rather than maintaining a large volume of social expenditure. Together, these reforms are intended to modernise the French economy and make it more competitive and dynamic.
On foreign policy, Édouard Philippe supports strengthening France's international role and European strategic autonomy. Unlike the far right, he takes the view that deepening European integration on strategic questions and strengthening Western alliances is entirely consistent with France's national interests and will reinforce its own standing. As president, Philippe wants to increase France's defence spending and substantially expand its military capabilities.
Notably, consistent support for Ukraine in the war against Russia is an important component of Édouard Philippe's foreign policy programme. Since 2022, he has visited Kyiv at least twice and met with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. He currently explicitly supports Macron's initiative to deploy European forces on Ukrainian territory and backs Ukraine's accession to NATO. While electoral rhetoric does not always translate into concrete action, a victory for Édouard Philippe would most likely allow Ukraine to maintain the level of support it currently receives under the presidency of Emmanuel Macron.
Gabriel Attal, Renaissance
Another notable presidential candidate is Gabriel Attal, a representative of Macron's Renaissance party and Prime Minister of France from 2023 to 2024. Attal belongs to the younger generation in French politics and embodies the continuation of the incumbent president's centrist course. For this reason, the media have taken to calling him a 'Macron clone' or 'little Macron.' He currently has around 7.5% support and is seen as a possible second-round candidate. Gabriel Attal's greatest strength and greatest weakness is his complete identification with the incumbent president: on one hand, he can claim continuity with Macron's political course; on the other, he inherits Macron's considerable negative rating and the widespread fatigue with what has been termed 'Macronism.'
Attal's economic programme centres on improving France's debt position and achieving a balanced budget. He has a fairly ambitious plan to reduce the budget deficit to 0% over ten years, consistent with the broader fiscal policy of French governments that have sought to rein in the country's runaway debt growth. He plans to achieve this through substantial cuts to the state apparatus, a freeze on most social benefits, continuation of the pension reform, and the creation of what he calls a 'zero budget impunity' mechanism. This last idea involves the immediate dismissal of ministers who overspend their budgets and a ban on the re-election of deputies who vote for deficit budgets. Beyond this, Attal plans to actively stimulate entrepreneurship, protect national industry, and promote the overall competitiveness of the French economy.
The centrist candidate also takes a moderate stance on immigration. He does not deny that problems exist in this area but does not support any radical measures, proposing instead to change the model for admitting new immigrants through the introduction of labour quotas.
On foreign policy, Gabriel Attal intends to stand firmly on pro-European and Atlanticist positions. He supports European integration processes and France's continued NATO membership. He is also supportive of Macron's recent initiatives to increase France's role in European nuclear deterrence and backs the country's rearmament.
Regarding the Russo-Ukrainian war, Gabriel Attal is a consistent supporter of Ukraine. Since 2022 he has visited Ukraine around four times, and from 2025 he has chaired the parliamentary friendship group with Ukraine. He explicitly frames continued support for Ukraine as being fully consistent with France's national interests. Attal's political background and foreign policy vision almost certainly mean that his arrival at the Élysée Palace would result in the continuation of France's current course on Ukraine.
What are the possible consequences of the French presidential election for Ukraine?
A notable feature of the next French presidential election may be the presence of a large number of candidates with broadly similar political orientations, something particularly visible among the moderate candidates. This situation will disperse the votes of moderate voters, making it all the more likely that radical candidates from both the far right and far left will reach the second round.
The greatest risk for Ukraine in the context of the French presidential election is the victory of one of the radical candidates. Despite representing entirely opposite ends of the political spectrum, both Marine Le Pen and Jean-Luc Mélenchon are critics of France's current domestic and foreign policy. A victory for either of them would in all likelihood mean a substantial revision of France's current approach to actively supporting Ukraine, moving towards a significant reduction or complete abandonment of that support. The election of a centre-right or centre-left candidate, by contrast, would most likely mean the continuation of France’s current level of support, or even its expansion. Édouard Philippe, Raphaël Glucksmann, and Gabriel Attal all hold clearly pro-Ukrainian positions.
* Birthright citizenship (jus soli) in France provides for the possibility of acquiring citizenship of a country by virtue of being born on its territory, regardless of the origin or citizenship of one's parents.
** Withdrawal from the integrated military command does not mean leaving NATO, but simply removes NATO's operational control over French forces in the event of military action involving the Alliance. From 1966 to 2009, France was not part of this structure, preferring to preserve its sovereignty on military matters.
Billi-Villi is an analytical media outlet that explains the mechanics of decision-making, the motivations of politicians, hidden interests, and the consequences that are already shaping the situation in the world and in Ukraine today.
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