FRANCE'S NUCLEAR INITIATIVE AND EUROPEAN STRATEGIC AUTONOMY

Since assuming the presidency in 2017, Emmanuel Macron has energetically promoted the idea of European ‘strategic autonomy,’ a concept deeply rooted in French international relations theory. It envisages, among other things, the expansion of pan-European collective security mechanisms that would ultimately minimise the role of the United States.

Despite the general difficulty of implementing this concept, Paris made substantial progress on one of its key aspects in March 2026: the doctrine of ‘forward deterrence.’ This involves the deployment of French strategic nuclear forces on the territory of nine other European countries: the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, Poland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Greece.

France has traditionally been invested in strengthening its image and influence on the international stage, particularly in the field of security and defence. Although the European region had long received considerably less attention than, say, Africa, Europe came to occupy an increasingly important place after Macron took office. In early 2020, the French president declared that France had its own ‘dimension of vital interests’ in Europe, and that their protection must be underpinned by a nuclear component.

Following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, France, as one of the leading EU member states, became closely involved in supporting Ukraine not only bilaterally but also in multilateral formats, including within the EU framework. As the war progressed, European countries moved towards ever closer alignment on security and defence.

The full-scale invasion made the need to improve not only national but pan-European security increasingly apparent, including on the question of European nuclear deterrence. Voices from Germany were particularly significant in this process, among them the then-Finance Minister Christian Lindner. This brought the two key European powers, France and Germany, closer together, effectively giving Paris the impetus for more active steps.

The pace accelerated with Donald Trump's arrival at the White House in 2025. The new American administration's conspicuous indifference to European security questions, its use of military presence as a bargaining chip, and even direct aggressive statements directed at European states all pushed European leaders to keep searching for arrangements under which the security of the continent would not depend on Washington's disposition. Germany continued to seek cooperation with France, and after his election victory Friedrich Merz declared his readiness to pursue a solution on the European nuclear component together with France and the United Kingdom.

Neither Merz nor anyone else has spoken of any intention to replace American nuclear weapons with French ones. Such steps are considered exclusively in the context of supplementing the American nuclear umbrella over Europe. The current American administration, despite its stated intentions to reduce its conventional military presence on the continent, continues to stress that no such plans exist for nuclear weapons. There is even talk in the media of an expansion of the American nuclear shield in Europe.

Nevertheless, the crisis of trust towards Washington among European capitals is driving the creation of contingency options for nuclear deterrence. It is therefore unsurprising that the Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany have joined the French nuclear deployment arrangement, since these three countries, along with Italy, are the only EU members that host American nuclear warheads on their soil.

The role of the Russian threat should not be understated either. By deciding to deploy nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory in 2023, Moscow deliberately escalated the nuclear security situation on the European continent. Although there is still no direct confirmation that nuclear warheads are present in Belarus, many indicators point to serious preparations for their deployment.

Russia's active use of nuclear blackmail, directed primarily against European countries, has also influenced decisions to strengthen nuclear deterrence policy. The countries with the greatest stake in this are the other participants in the French initiative: the United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Poland. Finland's potential accession, which is currently under discussion, follows a similar logic.

Greece, the other country that has agreed to this form of cooperation with France, may have somewhat different motivations, though protection against Trump's unpredictability and deterrence of Russia naturally remain relevant. Athens has the closest military cooperation with Paris of all eight partner countries. Beyond this, deepening that cooperation carries particular importance for Greece in the context of its relations with Turkey and the fact that American nuclear weapons are stationed on Turkish territory. Despite both Athens and Ankara being NATO members, having nuclear weapons on its own soil appears highly desirable for Greece's image and regional standing.

It is worth clarifying that the nature of the cooperation between France and the nine partner countries does not mean the permanent stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory. The arrangement is based on permission to deploy strategic nuclear forces, specifically Rafale combat aircraft capable of carrying nuclear armaments, and this deployment is not required to be permanent. Nuclear warheads remain entirely under French control. The agreement with Norway even explicitly states that no nuclear weapons will be present on Norwegian territory in peacetime. No additional conditions governing the use of French nuclear weapons are foreseen.

Drawing on the reasons behind the French nuclear initiative, we can identify three principal objectives. First, to create a contingency or supplementary instrument for American nuclear presence in Europe amid broader uncertainty. Second, to serve as a factor of strategic deterrence against Russia in Central-Eastern and Northern Europe. Third, to contribute to the development of pan-European capabilities in the protection of the continent against nuclear and other threats.

For France, this opens up the opportunity to become the leading country in strengthening Europe's defence capacity and even to replace the United States in certain respects, though this will be no easy task. Uncertainty is added, however, by the French presidential election scheduled for next year. Under the current administration, France's ‘vital interests’ are bound up with the defence of Europe and the deterrence of Russia. Under a future president, this understanding could change entirely, and with it the doctrine of forward deterrence. Billi-Villi is an analytical media outlet that explains the mechanics of decision-making, the motivations of politicians, hidden interests, and the consequences that are already shaping the situation in the world and in Ukraine today.