US NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR EUROPE: BRIEF OVERVIEW

Throughout Trump’s second term, his administration’s policies towards Ukraine, russia, and transatlantic alliances have been unpredictable and sometimes contradictory. The recently-released National Security Strategy attempts to outline a coherent vision for America’s new relationship with the world. The two-and-a-half pages on Europe are perhaps the most notable part of this vision, with the document’s harshest criticism reserved for its closest allies. Europe is portrayed as facing ‘civilisational erasure’ which could threaten its economies and militaries to the point that European countries can no longer be reliable allies. To many in Europe, the document’s commitment to cultivate internal resistance to existing European governments is a sign that America is already an unreliable ally. Danish intelligence recently classified America as a security risk due to Trump’s use of economic coercion and military threats against its partners. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is considered mostly through the prism of this hostile ideological attack, meaning that policy towards russia and Ukraine is an extension of the criticism for Europe.

Trump’s policy on russia is to seek ‘strategic stability’ bilaterally and to deploy ‘significant U.S. diplomatic engagement’ to manage Europe’s relations with the aggressor and mitigate the risk of direct conflict. The document’s preoccupation with chastising Europe leads it to imply that russia itself is not a threat, instead stating that ‘many Europeans regard Russia as an existential threat’ because civilisational decline has resulted in a lack of self-confidence. Thus, there is no direct criticism of russia for its illegal invasion or domestic oppression, and instead European governments are consistently presented as the problem: their diplomacy must be managed in order to avoid an escalated or expanded conflict; their economies are increasingly dependent on factories in China that use russian gas which is banned in Europe; and unstable minority governments ignore their populations to subvert America’s ‘peace’ efforts. It is hard to discern a strategy towards russia within this attack on Europe, but it seems clear that russia will benefit merely from being Europe’s adversary.

This policy is rife with contradictions because it is based on an assortment of ideological grievances rather than a coherent vision of what it wants to achieve. For example, it acknowledges that ‘European allies enjoy a significant hard power advantage over Russia by almost every measure, save nuclear weapons’, yet the strategy is premised on the idea that russia’s defeat is an ‘unrealistic expectation.’ Simultaneously, Europe is presented as lacking self-confidence despite America attempting to surrender a war that it is not fighting. The document criticises Europe’s lack of ‘political liberty’, its ‘censorship of free speech and suppression of political opposition’, and its ‘cratering birthrates’. However, none of these issues are raised with regards to russia where political opponents are murdered, the smallest criticism of the invasion results in a prison sentence, and in 2024 birthrates only rose in the majority-Muslim oblasts of the North Caucasus. This could be interpreted as concern for an ally, but if these issues are meant to threaten the peace process and stability across the continent, it is hard to see russia’s disregard for free speech and political liberty is not at least an equal threat. The omission of any criticism of russia indicates that this is an ideological manifesto rather than a true strategy for European security.

Regarding America’s policy towards Ukraine, the National Security Strategy offers very little. Ukraine is treated as the cause of much trouble rather than as an important actor, as demonstrated by referring to russia’s invasion as ‘the Ukraine war’. This is consistent with the document’s belief that ‘the outsized influence of larger, richer, and stronger nations is a timeless truth of international relations,’ which may partly explain the instinctive preference for russia’s position. Besides a commitment to ending the conflict, without specific details about how this will be achieved, the strategy aims ‘to enable the post-hostilities reconstruction of Ukraine to enable its survival as a viable state.’ Thus, Ukraine’s survival is desirable, or at least necessary, presumably for the broader aim of stability between Europe and russia. This policy is designed to stop Ukraine being Trump’s headache. The details of Ukraine’s future will depend on the outcome of russia’s invasion, but America has made only minimal commitments in this document.

This document attempts a sweeping and radical reevaluation of America’s role in the world, and it has been interpreted by some in Europe as a formal commitment to resetting the transatlantic relationship and European security architecture. However, there are several reasons to not over-rely on it for predictive analysis of America’s future foreign policy.

Firstly, the National Security Strategy emerged from among the competing voices within the Trump administration, but it does not indicate alignment. Its ideological criticism of Europe’s politics resembles the ideas expressed by J.D. Vance at the Munich Security Conference in February, and corresponds less to Marco Rubio’s neoconservatism. As Secretary of State, Rubio should theoretically have a greater role in shaping specific foreign policy than the vice president, yet the general uncertainty around which advisers have most influence over Trump on different issues at different times indicates that future strategy could be unpredictable.

Secondly, Trump’s foreign policy is also likely to be unpredictable because the president himself prefers this approach. The document praises Trump’s ‘unconventional diplomacy’ and his approach to negotiations is to radically change positions to pressure and incentivise different parties towards an outcome that benefits him or America. Although the document captures the current position of blaming Europe for the stalled peace process, it would have looked incongruous several months ago when Trump was accusing Putin of not wanting peace.

Finally, any National Security Strategy can be overtaken by unforeseen events. Biden’s team had to largely rewrite his strategy after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and George W. Bush unexpectedly ended up focusing on Islamic terrorism after 9/11. It is possible that Trump's strategy will be forced to change significantly due to unexpected events such as China invading Taiwan with russia's support or a collapse of the russian economy or regime. Billi-Villi is an analytical media outlet that explains the mechanics of decision-making, the motivations of politicians, hidden interests, and the consequences that are already shaping the situation in the world and in Ukraine today.