Trump’s Presidency as a Challenge to NATO

Against the backdrop of the war in the Middle East, US President Donald Trump has been expressing his sharpest criticism of NATO yet. Trump's threats to leave the alliance are not actually new; during his first presidential term, in 2018, he told leaders of other member states that he was ready to leave and sources within the administration confirmed this position to the media.

Despite the longstanding friction, however, mutual distrust has grown on both sides of the Atlantic in recent months and there are now grounds to treat Trump’s public statements and actions as a serious threat to transatlantic unity.

NATO countries have no obligation to provide any extraordinary assistance to the US under the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty. Trump has not invoked Article 5 or any other clause, while the right to grant permission to use bases or airspace in member states’ territory remains exclusively with national governments. In fact, Trump himself has repeated that the US does not need help in the war.

Nevertheless, the war has reshaped Trump’s understanding of NATO because he perceives member states’ positions on the Middle East war primarily as a loyalty test. In his view, NATO countries, and above all Europe, ‘owe’ the US for guaranteeing their security.

The president’s background in real estate leads him to view the world through the lens of property deals. In this sense, the US is like a landlord providing security services to tenants, or NATO members. Those tenants that spend less than required on defence, and particularly on contracts with American companies, are thus breaking the imagined agreement and relieving America of their own ‘protection’ duties. At the same time, in Trump’s view, alliance members should be grateful to him for the ‘American security umbrella’ by virtue of its existence which is solely due to American – and his own – generosity.

Furthermore, Trump’s criticism of NATO really refers only to certain European countries and Canada. He considers many European leaders to be weak, and despises this. For example, it is difficult to imagine Trump criticising Erdoğan in the same way he has criticised Macron, Starmer, Merz, and even Meloni, yet Turkey is equally a NATO member and has explicitly defined itself as neutral on the war against Iran. For Trump, NATO spending and support serve as outlets to vent his frustration about a ‘weak’ Europe.

Legally, Donald Trump could not unilaterally withdraw from NATO even if he wanted to, since a provision in the 2023 National Defence Authorization Act requires approval from both the House of Representatives and the Senate. The current Republican majorities in both chambers do not have enough votes to pass such a decision.

For now, the Republican Party’s Eurosceptic faction led by Vice President Vance, which would genuinely like to make good on Trump’s threats, does not hold an obvious political advantage within the administration. The Democrats, meanwhile, are generally more supportive of US international commitments and alliances.

Before the start of the Middle East war, most Americans maintained a positive view of NATO, even amid the situation surrounding Greenland. Since the war began, only a small share of US citizens – mostly Republicans – have changed their view. In other words, there has not been a fundamental shift in the American public’s perception of NATO, and thus there is no broad support for leaving the alliance.

In Europe, despite Trump's behavior, almost no one wants NATO to fall apart. Withdrawal from the alliance is advocated mainly by far-left parties who are not in government. The majority of political forces seek to preserve NATO, declaring that Europe must be responsible for its own security but only within the framework of the alliance.

Plans to create a ‘European army’ or a common security component within the European Union remain largely confined to politicians' speeches. The European Commission is doing legal work on the possible activation of Article 42.7 of the EU Treaty, focused on mutual defense, but at present there is no realistic possibility to transform the bloc into an alternative to NATO. Furthermore, there is currently no equivalent replacement for the American ‘nuclear umbrella.’ Despite public discussions about extending French nuclear doctrine to cover many European countries, Paris's nuclear capabilities are not comparable to what the US can provide.

The countries least interested in a US withdrawal from NATO are the Baltic states, southeastern Europe, and Poland. It is clear that they will do everything in their power to preserve Washington's presence in the alliance. In particular, unlike their Western European counterparts, representatives of NATO's eastern flank have been less eager to criticize US actions in the Middle East. Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Romania have publicly supported US actions against Iran, while Bulgaria has raised no objections.

At present, the US has taken no formal steps towards withdrawal and discussion of NATO’s collapse is premature. At the same time, there is no certainty that the US would defend members of the alliance if Russia decided to test NATO’s ‘unity.’

Even loyalty to Trump does not guarantee US protection today. Ultimately, any decision will depend on the president’s willingness to follow through on his public threats not to support NATO when the moment of need arises.

The most likely scenario is that NATO leaders will simply try to ‘outlast’ Trump's presidency, waiting for a new White House occupant who is more constructive on transatlantic relations. Simultaneously, NATO members must hope that Russia will not attempt to probe Article 5 before then. Billi-Villi is an analytical media outlet that explains the mechanics of decision-making, the motivations of politicians, hidden interests, and the consequences that are already shaping the situation in the world and in Ukraine today.