ZELENSKY RESHUFFLES THE GOVERNMENT

All for my ratings. Nothing against my ratings. Nothing for anyone else's ratings.

That, in short, is how one might describe President Zelensky's personnel policy — paraphrasing the well-known saying of the fascist dictator Mussolini..

Why is the appointment and dismissal of ministers by the president a problem in Ukraine?

There are presidential republics where the president serves as head of government and may appoint ministers — the United States, for example. However, the entire American political system is designed to maintain a balance between the branches of government and to ensure that the system of checks and balances functions properly. The president's powers in this regard are therefore counterbalanced by those of Congress and the courts, preventing the head of state from concentrating all power in his own hands.

As for Ukraine, despite the now well-established practice of ministerial appointments being made by the president, this cannot be treated as normal. Not only because it violates the law, but above all because it disrupts the balance of power between the branches of government in favour of excessive presidential authority.

Behind this practice lies the idea of authoritarianism and the restriction of freedom — values fundamentally at odds with the core principles of Ukrainian society. Had the aspiration for freedom not been so deeply rooted in Ukrainian identity, we could not have withstood thirteen years of Russian aggression. The desire for freedom is one of our greatest advantages over the aggressor.

The formal existence of democratic institutions is not in itself proof of democracy. The distinction between authoritarianism and democracy lies in whose interests the organs of power serve. In a democracy, they protect the fundamental rights and interests of society. Under authoritarianism, they serve to preserve the leader's hold on power.

If the president appoints the government on the basis of his own interest in retaining power and control, the criteria for selecting ministers will be entirely different from those that would apply if the government were appointed in the public interest.

It is worth remembering that Ukraine is a parliamentary-presidential republic. And at the heart of parliamentarism lies the most important principle of democracy — the principle of representation. Representation not of the president's interests, nor of oligarchs', nor of MPs' own interests, but of the interests of Ukrainians — of different groups of Ukrainians, including those who voted for other parties and candidates.

If parliament serves the interests of Ukrainians, then a coalition agreement represents a course of action built on finding a balance of interests within society — not a balance between the interests of the president, the oligarchs, and the deputies taken together. In that case, the appointment of ministers follows the logic of implementing the balance that parliament has identified. In other words, the people appointed are those whom the representatives of Ukrainians believe share this course of action and have the capacity to deliver it.

One might reasonably assume that most MPs have never asked themselves what parliament is for or what they are supposed to do there. They sincerely believe they are there to make decisions on our behalf. But a member of parliament represents the interests of their constituents — they act on a mandate, not in place of the people. Instead, our MPs use the power entrusted to them as an instrument for protecting their own rights, their own freedoms, and their own interests — exchanging their core functions for personal loyalty to Zelensky, outsourcing those functions to the Presidential Office. At our expense.

Parliament, in other words, is not fulfilling the functions that a representative body in a democratic country ought to fulfil. It does not represent the interests of Ukrainians; it merely maintains the façade and illusion of democracy, concealing authoritarianism behind its formal existence.

One of the hallmarks of authoritarianism is the restriction of political freedoms — in particular, political competition and, as a consequence, freedom of choice. This is precisely why Zelensky's ideal ministerial candidate is a generic "Shmyhal" (substitute Liashko, Marchenko, and so on). The profile looks like this: no independent agency, no political ambitions, loyalty, replaceability, self-sacrifice in the president's name. What matters above all is that the minister should not affect the president's ratings negatively — and should certainly not be building a personal profile to rival the president's, especially not by using the opportunities the president has granted him.

Why was Fedorov dismissed?

— Fedorov is worse than Shmyhal.

— Worse in what way?

— In that he is not Shmyhal.

We shall not assess Fedorov's qualities and abilities as Defence Minister here — that is a matter for military experts. What we will note is that he was one of the most significant members of Zelensky's team from the very beginning, and one of the architects and principal beneficiaries of the authoritarian political system. It was precisely thanks to authoritarian approaches to governance that Fedorov received the green light and unlimited authority for all his initiatives.

Until, that is, this began to translate into a significant rise in his popularity. Just before his appointment as Defence Minister in January 2026, the trust-distrust balance for Fedorov stood at +12%, whilst Zelensky's stood at +28%, according to KIIS polling. By June of this year, according to new KIIS polling, Fedorov's trust-distrust balance had risen to +29%, whilst Zelensky's had fallen to +27%. In other words, within five months in the role, Fedorov had managed to catch up with and even overtake Zelensky by 2 percentage points in terms of net trust.

In the interests of fairness, it should be noted that ratings were rising for many public figures — except Zelensky. But no one demonstrated the same rate of growth as Fedorov during his tenure as Defence Minister.

Nor can one ignore the fact that other public figures — Kyrylo Budanov and Ihor Terekhov, for instance — also enjoy high ratings. This may well have been one of the reasons Zelensky offered Budanov the position of head of the Presidential Office and Terekhov the position of head of government: to tighten his grip and prevent them from transitioning from potential to actual political rivals.

Unlike Budanov and Terekhov, Fedorov was, as Defence Minister, simultaneously accumulating political capital and influence alongside his popularity — raising his own profile both domestically and on the international stage. And all of this with Zelensky's direct assistance.

Whereas Budanov and Terekhov gained their popularity independently of Zelensky, Fedorov gained his with the president's active support. It is true, of course, that Zelensky himself once achieved his majority not without the help of influence operations — operations in which Fedorov was a key provider. But Zelensky had no wish to continue facilitating the rise of a political rival, which is entirely consistent with the logic of an authoritarian system. It is rather like sawing off the branch on which you are sitting.

Why, in the public imagination, is Fedorov "not Shmyhal"?

When one "Shmyhal" is replaced by another, we do not take to the streets. We are not particularly troubled by the fact that no "Shmyhal" represents our interests — that each is merely a cog in the authoritarian machine. No great grievance arises against the autocracy. The system of "Shmyhals" creates a trap: the impression that there is no real alternative. And so there is no incentive to defend democracy and freedom of choice when the illusion persists that there is no one worth choosing.

Fedorov worked systematically on his public image. The position of Defence Minister allowed him to convert that image into public support. In Fedorov, people saw an alternative — and a mode of direct democracy was activated. There was suddenly a reason to defend the choice, because the illusion of a choice had appeared.

Influence techniques then allowed the public's demand for justice to be substituted with a demand for Fedorov's reinstatement. A displacement of objectives occurred: instead of demanding justice, we are demanding Fedorov's return. But his return does not establish justice.

In lieu of a conclusion: so why did we take to the streets?

For Fedorov? Against Syrskyi? Against Zelensky?

Against the president's usurpation of rights and freedoms that belong to society and ought to be exercised through elected representatives?

To do the work of parliaments that neither understand nor wish to understand the true purpose of their existence?

Or, after all — for justice?

Billi-Villi is an analytical media outlet that explains the mechanics of decision-making, the motivations of politicians, hidden interests, and the consequences that are already shaping the situation in the world and in Ukraine today.