THE WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST: NEW CHALLENGES FOR UKRAINE

The military operation against Iran launched by Israel and the United States has escalated into a full-scale regional war, drawing in the majority of Middle Eastern countries. For Ukraine, the latest crisis in the region carries tangible risks but has also opened up new opportunities that were previously out of reach.

One important consequence for Ukraine is a significant weakening of Iran's ability to supply weapons to Russia for use in its war of aggression. However, Iranian assistance is now less significant than North Korea’s, and considerably less meaningful than China’s. From 2022-2024, Tehran directly provided Moscow with strike drones – including the Shahed-136 – and munitions.

After Russia began localising strike drone production, its dependence on Iranian materiel assistance gradually decreased. Nevertheless, the exchange of military technology evidently continues at some level, and Ukrainian strikes against port infrastructure on the Caspian Sea are attempts to disrupt this. Ambiguity had also existed over whether Iran was supplying ballistic missiles to Russia, with the media discussing this possibility since 2022 but no confirmed use case ever emerging. Now, Iran’s military needs preclude such transfers and so Ukraine will not face this additional threat any time soon.

Iran's large-scale use of strike drones against American military and civilian infrastructure in the Middle East, as well as against US-allied countries, opens up opportunities for Ukraine to export its solutions for countering this type of threat. The United States and Middle Eastern countries – including Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar – have already expressed concrete interest in acquiring Ukrainian anti-drone air defence systems, potentially attracting significant funds to Ukraine while bringing its products onto the international market. Ukrainian manufacturers have reported their readiness to fulfill contracts, emphasising that current production capacity allows them to produce more than Ukraine itself requires for the war against Russia.

Alongside the shipment of weapons to the Middle East, Ukraine has also deployed specialists in drone systems to Qatar, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia, as well as to protect American military infrastructure in Jordan. In part, this decision aims to obtain air defence missiles in return – particularly for Patriot systems – along with diplomatic support from the Gulf states for a peaceful resolution to Russia’s invasion. It is currently difficult to assess whether Middle Eastern countries hold significant stocks of Patriot interceptors, as their intensive use in the early days of the war against Iran has driven interest in cheaper Ukrainian solutions.

At the same time, the threat of Iranian ballistic missile strikes persists despite a drop in intensity, and only Patriot and THAAD systems provide sufficient defence. Furthermore, the desire of the United States and its Middle Eastern allies to replenish their stocks of Patriot interceptors risks limiting supplies to Ukraine. As of mid-2025, approximately 850–880 interceptors of this type were being produced worldwide per year – equivalent to the number expended in the first few days of the war in the Middle East.

Beyond the practical benefits, it is important for Ukraine to improve its image and perception on the international stage. Kyiv can demonstrate that it is not merely a recipient of aid, but also a country willing to assist its partners and allies and to protect civilian infrastructure from targeted attacks.

Ukraine's practical assistance is also aimed at improving US-Ukrainian relations, particularly in light of media reports about the US declining in August to receive Ukrainian drone interceptors – interceptors that the Americans ultimately turned to Ukraine for once the war against Iran began. This desired outcome is far from guaranteed, as Trump administration officials have said almost nothing publicly about Ukraine’s assistance and the president himself made only a dismissive remark about Kyiv’s willingness to help shoot down Iranian drones.

Russia's involvement in the war between Iran and the United States remains limited in scope. Moscow cannot afford to openly support Iran with significant material resources, as its own resources are tied down by the war against Ukraine and by the threat of a negative reaction from Trump. This undoubtedly damages Russia's image as a reliable partner, against the backdrop of events in Syria in late 2024 and Venezuela earlier this year. At the same time, Putin is currently excluded from major diplomatic interventions in Middle Eastern affairs through which he could ‘exchange’ his mediation services for the concessions on Ukraine that the Kremlin has been seeking over the past year.

So far, the best outcome of the Middle Eastern war for Russia has been rising oil prices. For Ukraine this carries significant risks, as it will allow the Kremlin to sustain its military expenditure and plug the holes in a budget that was expected to run a deficit no smaller than last year’s.

During the first week of the war in the Middle East, Russia managed to earn only slightly more in oil revenues than the week before. This was partly due to Ukraine’s strike on the oil terminal in Novorossiysk during the early hours of 2 March which put it out of action until the weekend. By the end of the second week, however, revenues had jumped by nearly 50% to $2 billion from seaborne oil. On Wednesday, 11 March, Urals crude oil was trading at around $62 per barrel although the price constantly fluctuated. In addition, the volume of Russian oil ‘stuck at sea’ – that is, sitting on tankers awaiting buyers – also decreased as India purchased tens of millions of barrels. If the Middle Eastern conflict drags on and Gulf states reduce their oil and LNG production, Russian oil and gas revenues are likely to increase further due to high prices and increased shipments. 

The situation for Ukraine could also be worsened if American sanctions are further weakened in some form. The US initially granted India a 30-day sanctions exemption for purchasing Russian oil already at sea, which generated additional revenue for Moscow. According to media reports, the Trump administration was considering several options for relaxing sanctions. Ultimately, on 13 March, the US lifted all sanctions on Russian oil that had already been loaded onto tankers prior to that date. The estimated volume of exempted oil was approximately 135 million barrels. This represents a ‘middle option’ that hands Russia a bonus while leaving the core sanctions on Russian companies in place.

Nevertheless, even greater sanctions relief on Russian oil cannot be ruled out at this stage because prices are continuing to rise and there is no clear route to resolving the conflict. This potentially threatens to dismantle the strategy of economic pressure on Russia which, through joint European and American efforts, has caused serious problems for the Russian economy. Sustained oil prices of over $60 per barrel, combined with possible sanctions relief for companies like Rosneft or Lukoil, would strengthen Russia’s capacity to wage a war of attrition. More importantly, it would increase the Kremlin’s confidence in its inevitable victory.

Despite the new opportunities that the war in the Middle East has presented Ukraine, the risks nevertheless outweigh them. The most dangerous of these is the fuel crisis, which opens up new avenues for Russia to significantly increase its profits from oil and gas. At the same time, the American administration’s uncertainty and its attempts to weaken sanctions against Russia’s oil sector only amplify the danger for Ukraine. Ukraine does, however, retain tools capable of minimising Russia’s gains as demonstrated during the first week of the Iran conflict.

Billi-Villi is an analytical media outlet that explains the mechanics of decision-making, the motivations of politicians, hidden interests, and the consequences that are already shaping the situation in the world and in Ukraine today.