WHY MIGHT RUSSIA ESCALATE AGAINST UKRAINE'S SUPPORTERS?

The prospect of Russia escalating its war onto EU and NATO territory is drawing growing attention in political circles and the media. This article examines why the Kremlin might choose to escalate, what it hopes to achieve, and what Europe and NATO can do to prevent Moscow from carrying out its plans. 

The purpose of CIA Director John Ratcliffe’s visit to Moscow on 25 August remains somewhat unclear, but an American belief that Russia is considering a military operation against NATO territory appears to have played a role. The Wall Street Journal was the first to break the story of Ratcliffe’s visit, and placed it in the context of U.S. intelligence assessments that Putin might test Article 5 cohesion with a limited attack as early as this autumn. POLITICO then reported that Ratcliffe’s primary objective was to warn Russian officials against escalatory action in the Baltic states which explains why his plane departed for Moscow from Riga, Latvia. Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda also confirmed that the leadership of the Baltic countries had been briefed on the trip in advance, and on 12  August the Lithuanian Cabinet approved an expedited plan to build defensive trenches along its borders with Belarus and Kaliningrad.

From Putin’s perspective, initiating a direct confrontation with NATO could be a decisive way to break Western support for Ukraine. Alongside the planned Russian mobilisation to pressure the frontlines, and the renewed strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure to pressure the rear, an incursion in the Baltics would be part of a broader strategy to end the war on Russia’s terms. The ongoing campaign of sabotage, cyberattacks, threats, and ‘wayward’ missiles and drones in European countries shows that Russia already considers Europe to be a theatre of the war. A limited military operation would simply be another step from hybrid war towards conventional war.

Unlike the winter from 2021 to 2022, when the British and American intelligence services were adamant that Putin had decided to launch a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, there is no certainty on the Kremlin’s intentions in the Baltics. The Baltic leaders themselves are distinctly  calm, although Zelenskyy’s public dismissal of Western warnings before the full-scale invasion demonstrates that such calm can either be strategic messaging or genuine misjudgement. Putin still appears to be undecided, and Ratcliffe’s visit may have sought to reveal or influence his thinking. If some escalation along NATO’s eastern frontier is genuinely under consideration, then it is important to understand why in order to deter and prepare for it.

Since 2022, the invasion of Ukraine has taken priority over almost everything else in Putin’s decision-making. After a period in which Russia's negotiating posture proved disingenuous, Trump's preoccupation with Iran has given Putin room to return to the uncompromising pursuit of ‘victory’ rather than simply waiting to outlast Ukraine and its supporters. In autumn 2022, when Russia’s progress had clearly stalled and the Istanbul negotiations had ended, the Kremlin doubled down by ‘annexing’ the occupied oblasts and adopting three vectors of pressure. On the frontlines, Russia gained a manpower advantage through the first mobilisation. In the Ukrainian rear, the first wave of attacks on energy infrastructure sought to break society’s resistance. And to end Western support for Ukraine, the Kremlin escalated its nuclear rhetoric leading Joe Biden to warn that the risks of nuclear ‘Armageddon’ were at their highest level since the Cuban Missile Crisis.

September 2026 has many echoes of September 2022. The mobilisation reportedly planned for the coming months, though denied by the Kremlin, would be an attempt to regain the initiative on the frontlines. On 1 September, Putin announced he had given the order for attacks on energy infrastructure to resume, while the new tactic of near-constant drones over Kyiv adds further pressure to the civilian population and military industry through paralysing air alarms. Russia’s nuclear threats no longer carry the same weight as 2022, partly because they have lost credibility, partly because China has firmly forbidden the use of  nuclear weapons, and partly because Trump’s reaction is much less predictable than Biden’s. An incursion into NATO territory in the Baltics, or another such escalation of the ongoing campaign of sabotage across Europe, could therefore be the new third vector that attempts to break Ukraine’s financial and military support.

There are two primary logics behind this.

Firstly, it could act as a deterrent by directly demonstrating to European countries the risks of further support for Ukraine. The Baltic states are among Ukraine’s greatest supporters relative to their size and so are an obvious place to demonstrate this, but the consequences of conflict there would also reverberate throughout the European Union and NATO. Even if Ukraine’s strongest supporters are not deterred, it would be sufficient for Russia if some EU countries waver enough to paralyse joint initiatives or Trump decides to further restrict weapons sales and intelligence support. The same is true among Europe’s electorates, where increased fear of supporting Ukraine could be decisive for next year’s French presidential election or the fate of Merz’s unpopular government in Germany. Deterrence would also affect diplomacy, as Europe may reconsider its almost unconditional support for Kyiv’s negotiating position in favour of one that avoids risks of further escalation. Without this diplomatic, military, and financial cover, Ukraine would be significantly weaker and closer to Putin’s goal of capitulation.

Secondly, an escalation in the Baltics could disproportionately redirect NATO equipment which would otherwise be sent to Ukraine. Even if the principle of supporting Ukraine does not falter, supplying military necessities like air defence systems or artillery to Kyiv would be even harder if the faith in Article 5 protection is shattered across Europe. And even if Article 5 is fully enforced and the incursion is swiftly repelled, the psychological damage that Article 5 alone no longer deters Russia would have lasting effects. Munitions production would be redirected, Patriot missile stocks would be fiercely protected, and financial support intended for Kyiv might be reappropriated for countries’ own defence budgets. A Russian incursion would necessarily be limited in terms of manpower, equipment, and munitions in order to avoid full-scale war, but it could have outsized effects in terms of damaging the resources Ukraine receives from its partners.

Recent intelligence assessments have pointed to a rapidly shortening timescale for Russia's threats to the Baltic states, with the Wall Street Journal reporting one assessment that an incursion could happen as early as this autumn. This reflects both Putin's frustration with the war in Ukraine and his sense that the window to redefine Russia's relationship with NATO is closing.

The war against Ukraine has placed Russia’s economy in the ‘death zone’ as Russian economist Alexandra Prokopenko terms it, but it cannot continue cannibalising itself indefinitely like a mountaineer above 8,000m. Trump’s leverage to force a bad deal on Ukraine also diminishes as the 2028 presidential election gets closer, because Ukraine knows that waiting for a new president becomes easier with each passing month. Putin also knows that dissatisfaction within Russia will grow if there are no obvious successes in Ukraine.

Alongside this growing imperative to conclude the war against Ukraine, Putin may see a shrinking opportunity to achieve a longer-term, separate but mutually reinforcing aim of undermining NATO. Moscow already endures most of the costs Europe is willing to impose, so a limited incursion may be less costly for Russia now than it would have been before 2022, or than it would be after a peace agreement with Ukraine. Russia currently has far more  experience with drone warfare than NATO armies, but Europe’s rapid rearmament means  resistance is only likely to get stronger the longer that Putin waits. Perhaps most importantly, Putin reportedly sees America as weakened by the Iran war and disinterested in protecting Europe. Trump’s ambiguity on Article 5, troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe, and preference for dialogue with Russia over firm support for Ukraine all strengthen this assumption.

An escalation would also carry serious risks for Russia, though Putin’s miscalculation in launching the full-scale invasion suggests that this will not necessarily deter him. One risk is that a decisive NATO response would strengthen the alliance and remove the doubt over Article 5 that Russia is currently exploiting. It could also draw America into direct confrontation with Russia, ending Trump’s  strategic ambiguity. A second is that escalation could galvanise European governments and populations against Russian aggression instead of deterring them, reinvigorating support for Ukraine just as Russia is counting on Western war-weariness to erode that support. A failed operation in the Baltics would also expose Putin to consequences from China for destabilising the global order, from Russian hawks for his weakness, or from oligarchs and technocrats for escalating the war rather than seeking its end.

Unlike the winter from 2021-2022, when the Russian troop buildup on Ukraine’s borders was an undeniable indicator of intention, a limited incursion in the Baltics would not need such noticeable preparation. The full-scale invasion of Ukraine also defied logic in many ways, but Putin’s information bubble made it appear perfectly rational to him; Ukrainians would not resist, the West would merely watch as they did with Crimea, and the Russian intelligence agencies had already thoroughly infiltrated the Ukrainian state, or so he was told. Without knowing what information Putin receives, it is very difficult to know which decision will appear rational to him. When Ratcliffe's predecessor Bill Burns visited Moscow in November 2021, he returned convinced that Putin had already decided to launch the full-scale invasion. Ratcliffe’s visit may have sought the same clarity, but since Putin refused to meet with him, the uncertainty may persist even among Western intelligence services.

Billi-Villi is an analytical media outlet that explains the mechanics of decision-making, the motivations of politicians, hidden interests, and the consequences that are already shaping the situation in the world and in Ukraine today.