EU FOREIGN POLICY: UNANIMITY CAN ONLY BE OVERCOME BY UNANIMITY

The frequent blocking of key European Union foreign policy initiatives calls into question the bloc's ability to act effectively on the international stage. This has been particularly acute in recent years, as Hungary has regularly obstructed a common policy on Ukraine and the Russo-Ukrainian war. Recent media leaks have shown that the Hungarian authorities managed to exploit the veto effectively – and to do so not in the interests of Hungarians but of Russia, a country that is outside the bloc and, moreover, a fundamental threat to its security. However, even with the change of leadership in Budapest, the EU will not begin to act swiftly and decisively. The key issue lies in the very concept of unanimous decision-making in matters of common foreign policy which has been a foundational principle since the establishment of the European Communities.

Two main reasons underlie the introduction of the unanimity principle in EU foreign policy decision-making. First, the founding of the European Economic Community (EEC), the EU's predecessor, was aimed at deepening economic, industrial, and energy cooperation on the European continent. Conducting a common foreign policy was simply not a priority for European capitals, or considerably subordinate to the practicalities of cooperating with one another. In plain terms, a common market did not require a foreign policy dimension.

Questions of collective security, which are an integral part of foreign policy, could be discussed and coordinated by European countries within NATO. Certain matters did, however, require additional coordination within the European Communities. Above all, the question of enlargement concerned all member states and required a common policy, and therefore the principle of unanimity in decision-making. Other foreign policy questions, such as joint action in promoting human rights, the rule of law, democracy, and so on, were of lesser importance.

This brings us to the second reason: the insufficient institutionalisation of common foreign policy. The initial challenges facing EEC member states required coordination, but not a unified policy. For this reason, the unanimity principle was considered appropriate at the time. Furthermore, since the capacity to conduct an independent foreign policy is one of the important hallmarks of national sovereignty, it is natural that capitals are reluctant to abandon the unanimity principle.

With the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, and especially with the conclusion of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, the European Union took on its current form and the bloc’s common foreign policy was formalised. The Maastricht Treaty introduced a partial change to the decision-making mechanism as qualified majority voting became possible in place of unanimity under certain clearly-defined conditions. Nevertheless, member states retained the decisive voice as any foreign policy decision required consensus.

Throughout the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries it became clear that the EU required greater flexibility in international relations. This provided the impetus for the creation, under the Amsterdam and Lisbon treaties, of dedicated bodies within the Union's executive branch to handle foreign policy matters. Nonetheless, the authority to agree on foreign policy rests exclusively with the European Council which acts by common agreement. The European Union is a supranational entity whose institutions derive their powers exclusively through the voluntary transfer (delegation) of corresponding rights by member states. The confederal character of the EU is most clearly evident in the absence of a single ‘head’ of the union.

The highest authority of the European Union, albeit without the right to initiate legislation, is the European Council which comprises the leaders of all member states. This is the institution that takes the most important decisions at the political level and determines the bloc’s foreign policy direction unanimously.

Moreover, states join the confederation and surrender a share of national sovereignty for a clearly defined purpose. The European Union was and remains primarily an economic – or economic and trade – confederation, despite cautious movement towards federalisation and the expansion of EU institutional competences in other areas.

The fundamental transformation or replacement of current practices, which were introduced in the second half of the last century, requires above all a change in mindset. It is unsurprising that EU institutional figures, most prominently European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, are calling for a repositioning of Europe and a transformation of the European Union from an association of countries into an independent actor on the international stage. In such a scenario they would gain greater powers and, accordingly, greater freedom in decision-making.

Even a shift to qualified majority voting on common foreign policy decisions within the European Council would represent a fundamental break, symbolising a transition from an economic confederation to, at minimum, a political-economic one. At the same time, achieving this transition requires the consent of all union members, making it an almost insurmountable challenge. Unanimity can only be overcome by unanimity.

Furthermore, the growing popularity of Eurosceptic parties offers little hope that national governments will, in the future, voluntarily relinquish the ability to veto EU foreign policy. In the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, France, Germany, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Sweden, political forces that are critical of ‘Eurocrats’ and wish instead to see a reduction in the powers of EU institutions enjoy high or rising popularity.

Despite shared dangers and challenges, Europe remains fragmented. Since antiquity, no unified state has emerged across the majority of the European continent as a durable long-term project.

Federalisation, or a United States of Europe, might at first glance seem a logical development, given the trajectory of political development and integration processes on the continent. Nevertheless, the logical coherence of a scenario does not mean it has a high probability of actually coming to pass.

On the contrary, Brussels pushing integration processes further risks intensifying nationalist sentiment among Union members. By tolerating one or several countries’ vetoes of common foreign policy initiatives, European nations continue to hold on to their own sovereignty.

This is why shifts in aspects of common foreign policy are so difficult for European countries; they are part of far broader processes than simply dispensing with an Orbán or a Fico.

Billi-Villi is an analytical media outlet that explains the mechanics of decision-making, the motivations of politicians, hidden interests, and the consequences that are already shaping the situation in the world and in Ukraine today.